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Information and network management security Investment 
 
Mathews Z. Nkhoma, Hamid Jahankhani, Haralambos Mouratidis 
Innovative Informatics Research group,  School of Computing and Technology 
 
Abstract: In today’s business environment it is difficult to obtain senior management approval for 
the expenditure of valuable resources to “guarantee “that a potentially disastrous event will not occur 
that could affect the organisation performance. Analysing potential risk and the allocation of 
resources for computer network security and business continuity require strategic, long-term 
planning. Most companies tend to be reactive and respond with quick infrastructure solutions. A 
strategic approach to computer network security leads to a more efficient plan and a less expensive 
risk-management strategy. Financial modelling is a fundamental component of all business 
investment cases. IT security investment proposals have unique qualities that can pose expenditure 
justification challenges. This paper aims to explore various financial models and to develop one that 
IT managers can effectively use to support their business cases. 
 
1. Introduction: 
 
The business risk for a company engaged in 
technologically dependent business is 
normally greater than for one that is not. 
Business operations present a unique set of 
risks, including an increased reliance on 
technology and increased vulnerability to 
the rapid changes in technology. In 
addition, industry structures can erode 
rapidly because Internet shopping 
facilitates price competition and transforms 
core business structures to promote 
distribution by mail and remote customer 
service. To address such challenges, a 
company or a certain organisation needs to 
develop an effective strategy. An effective 
strategy requires operational efficiency; 
within organisation's information systems, 
this means an emphasis on information 
security and controls. A cost-effective 
business internal control system should be 
designed and implemented toward the goal 
of reduced operating expenses and 
therefore increased profits. Reducing 
operating expenses and increasing profits 
are critical to the success, even the 
continued survival, of companies heavily 
engaged in business.  
Computers have found their way into all 
areas of business, industry, education and 
government. Increasingly far reaching 
information networks linking computers 
and databases provide important benefits, 
including greater staff productivity and a 
sharper competitive edge. The more that we 
expand the reach of our information 
networks, the more important network 
security becomes. Basically, this paper 
discusses the relevant issues about security 
particularly the security in information 
management and network management.  
Financial modelling is a fundamental 
component of all business investment 
cases. IT security investment proposals 
have unique qualities that can pose 
expenditure justification challenges. This 
research is designed to explore various 
financial models and to develop one that IT 
managers can effectively use to support 
their business cases. 
 
2. Information security 
management: 
 
An effective information security program 
incorporates a combination of 
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technological and human controls in order 
to avoid the loss of information, deter 
accidental or intentional unauthorised 
activities, prevent unauthorised data access, 
detect a loss or impending loss, recover 
after a loss has occurred, and correct 
system vulnerabilities to prevent the same 
loss from happening again (Jahankhani and 
Nkhoma 2004). Correspondence among 
businesses, internal or external, is 
conducted through data transmissions. Data 
transmissions pass in networks of 
interconnected portals where parties could 
get in touch with one another. Networks 
need to be protected from both outsiders 
such as hackers and crackers, and insiders 
such as employees and other individuals 
with access to the network. The industry 
defines hackers as individuals with 
extensive computing knowledge that look 
for internal and external system holes, 
some for fun, and others for a purpose. 
Crackers are individuals that try to break 
into a system by guessing or cracking user 
and system passwords.   
In a world where hackers, computer viruses 
and cyber-terrorists are making the 
headlines daily, security has become a 
priority in all aspects of life, including 
business. But how much does a business 
become secure? How much security is 
enough? How much does a business know 
when its security level is reasonable? Most 
importantly what’s the right amount of 
money and time to invest in security? 
Making computer and communication 
systems more secure is both a technological 
challenge and a managerial problem. The 
technology exists to incorporate adequate 
security safeguards within these systems, 
but the managerial demand for secure 
systems is virtually nonexistent outside of 
the defense and financial industries. That so 
many of our commercial systems provide 
marginal security at best is a reflection of 
the lack of managerial awareness and 
understanding of the need to protect the 
information stored in, and transmitted 
between, computers. The economic 
ramifications of inadequate security can be 
significant. To illustrate, Volkswagen lost 
almost $260 million as the result of an 
insider scare that created phony currency-
exchange transactions and then covered 
them with real transactions a few days 
later, pocketing the float as the exchange 
rate was changing (Neumann, 2002). 
Similarly, The Bank of New York 
experienced a $32 billion overdraft as the 
result of a processing error that went 
unchecked. The bank had to borrow $24 
billion to cover its transactions for one day, 
and paid $5 million for the day's interest 
(Neumann, 2001). Furthermore, when the 
government of India requested bids on a 
billion-dollar contract for jet fighters, 
French intelligence agents stole bid 
information submitted by the United States 
and gave it to a French firm competing for 
the contract. The proprietary information 
helped the French company to win the 
contract (Mello, 2002). Likewise, a group 
of hackers, operating under the name 
Masters of Deception, victimised such 
companies as Southwestern Bell, New 
York Telephone Company, Pacific Bell, 
US West, TRW Inc., Information America 
Inc., Martin Marietta Electronics 
Information and Missile Group, ITT 
Corporation, Educational Broadcast 
Corporation, Bugle Boy, New York 
University, and the University of 
Washington. The hackers stole credit 
reports, and altered or deleted files at some 
sites. Southwestern Bell alone reportedly 
spent $370,000 to repair corrupted 
programs and to buy more secure hardware 
and software (Kaplan & Clyde, 2003). 
Information security, right now, is a 
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confused and paradoxical business. For 
example: 
 
You've increased spending significantly, 
and you're told this is a good thing, and yet 
it has had zero effect in mitigating security 
breaches.  
You're constantly warned about "digital 
Pearl Harbors" and yet the vast majority of 
incidents you report are relatively small, 
don't last long and don't cost much.  
You're told that aligning security and 
business strategies is a top priority, and yet 
those who have fared best in avoiding 
breaches, downtime and security-related 
damages are the least likely to be aligned 
with the business. But in another sense, you 
seem to be contributing to the confusion.  
Respondents who suffered the most 
damages from security incidents were two 
times more likely than the average 
respondent to plan on decreasing security 
spending next year.  
Those with the most damages were nearly 
half as likely to list staff training as one of 
their top three priorities.  
A quarter of you neither measured nor 
reviewed the effectiveness of your 
information security policies and 
procedures in the past year. 
In short, the survey shows that as much as 
the nascent information security discipline 
has grown since its baptism—on Sept. 18, 
2001 (one week after the terrorist attacks 
and the day the Nimda worm Hit)—it hasn't 
much improved with age. 
Network resources allow worldwide access 
to information, no matter where it resides, 
or where the users are located. 
Unfortunately, the physical and logical 
controls used by an organisation to secure 
its information offer no protection when 
that information is being electronically 
transmitted. In a survey, which included 
responses from 538 computer security 
practitioners in various institutions, 
contained some sobering figures that 85% 
of respondents detected computer security 
breaches in the last 12 months while 64% 
acknowledged financial losses due to the 
breaches. Similarly, it found out that 35% 
quantified their losses, a total of almost 
$400 million while 40% detected system 
penetration from the outside. Its findings 
also reflected that 91% detected employee 
abuse of Internet access privileges while 
94% detected computer viruses. 
(Niederhoffer, 2002)  
Concomitantly, another survey found that 
U.S. businesses spent only 0.02% of their 
top-line revenue on data security and that 
75% of business networks are wide open to 
hacking. (Mello, 2002) Although smaller 
companies seldom see themselves as 
targets, experts say attackers scan entire 
networks and view any site as fair game. A 
useful way to think of the Internet is as a 
series of smaller networks that anyone can 
access. Corporations or governments 
manage many of these smaller networks 
but no one has overall control. There are 
opposing views as to what role the 
government should play. Individuals 
outside of an organisation pose threats to 
communication security, and their attacks 
can be active or passive. Active attacks 
intentionally cause the transmitted 
information to be changed. An intruder 
could make undetected and unauthorised 
modifications to the contents of a 
transmitted message. Information may be 
deleted or delayed, or changes could be 
made to the order in which a series of 
messages are transmitted. The destination 
address of a message could be changed, 
causing the message to be directed to 
another party. Or the origination address 
could be altered, causing the receiver of the 
message to believe that the transmission 
was sent from a different source. 
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Legitimate messages could be recorded and 
later played back, allowing an unauthorised 
user to establish a connection under a false 
identity, or causing a transaction to be 
performed twice. Active attacks are easier 
to detect than to prevent.  
Similarly, passive attacks result in the 
unauthorised disclosure of transmitted 
information. Passive threats to security 
arise whenever messages are intercepted 
and read by outsiders. (Kaplan and Clyde, 
2003) In some cases, the mere existence of 
message traffic is important to an intruder 
because the pattern of messages may reveal 
the amount of business being transacted 
between different users. Passive attacks are 
easier to prevent than to detect. 
With the emergence of technological 
advancements in data transmission among 
businesses, the installation of a security 
system has become a requirement. The 
network operating system (NOS) is 
typically the first layer of security in 
controlling user access from a logical 
security perspective, especially in a 
distributed system. The NOS controls the 
user identification, authentication, 
authorisation, and many security and 
permissions settings for all users and 
resources on the network. In user 
identification, the user tells the NOS who 
he or she is. The NOS authenticates the 
user by mapping user-supplied credentials, 
such as user IDs and passwords, to a 
centralised user store of networked 
systems. The NOS then authorises the user 
to perform various functions (such as read 
data, change data, delete data, or execute 
programs) based on stored user and group 
settings established by the network 
administrator.  
Although individual application-level 
security usually controls what functions a 
user can perform within applications, 
poorly designed or ineffective NOS 
controls may allow data to be manipulated 
outside the applications, thereby violating 
the confidentiality, integrity, and 
availability of the underlying information. 
(Rogers and Freiberg, 1994) However, 
failure to consider NOS security controls 
may lead to unfounded reliance on the 
application, reconciliation, and monitoring 
controls. The general computer controls 
review should include an assessment of the 
controls surrounding the NOS. Such testing 
would examine applicable service packs 
and security updates installed, system 
configurations, and network connections.  
Moreover, unauthorised access to data is a 
major risk faced by enterprises. News 
groups, discussion forums, and best-selling 
books such as Hacking Exposed (McClure 
et al. 2001) have made it relatively easy to 
gain unauthorised access to corporate 
information resources. Therefore it is 
imperative for organisations to keep abreast 
of patches, updates, and proper system 
settings. To ensure adequate controls at 
every level of the information technology 
infrastructure, public accounting firms and 
corporate internal audit divisions are 
increasingly hiring information technology 
specialists. 
In this light, organisations could safeguard 
their data and decrease the possibility of 
losses and distortions during transmission 
by several measures. An organisation could 
use network-monitoring software. Such 
software monitors the data flow and detects 
weak points--hardware configurations or 
software arrangements that are likely to 
cause transmission errors. Organisations 
could also upgrade to conditioned 
telecommunication lines. Because such 
lines are cleaner in producing less static 
and other encumbrances in transmission 
rates that can be boosted without errors, 
resulting in lower transmission costs. Fiber 
optic lines offer the most advantages in 
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data efficiency and security; they are 
capable of carrying enormous volumes of 
data at high speeds with little or no 
distortion, and they are almost impossible 
to tap. Fiber optic lines, however, are not 
yet widely available. Similarly, the 
application of protocol controls is also 
required. In a typical situation, software 
monitors the transmission reliability by 
directing the receiving and sending 
software to acknowledge the transmission 
link, then agree on a transmission protocol 
and finally verify the accuracy of the data 
transmitted. Likewise, the enforcement of 
backup and recovery procedures is 
essential. No network is fail-safe. As a 
network design becomes more 
sophisticated, the probability increases that 
at least some part of it will fail. Backup and 
recovery procedures provide contingency 
planning for network downtime and include 
securing alternate network facilities, 
planning for alternate means of data 
transmission and eliminating confusion 
over what data were preserved in instances 
of transmission interruption. More 
importantly, the use of network access 
controls is deemed necessary. Determined 
hackers can break into almost every 
computer network. Any organisation 
without access controls--passwords--is 
inviting trouble. Depending on the 
organisation, passwords should be assigned 
to every user at various levels of the 
operation. In some cases, this may even 
mean assigning selective access to specific 
computer files.  
 
3. The Way Forward: 
 
Before spending money on a security 
product or service, most decision makers 
will want to know that the investment is 
financially justified. There’s no point in 
implementing a solution if its true cost is 
greater than the risk exposure. 
Setting the IT budget is often an 
unstructured exercise with a lack of 
recognized methodology and no link to 
strategic goals of the organization. The 
outcome is often a proposed budget that 
bears little relationship to business 
requirements and value. 
In order to determine how much should be 
spent on security a decision maker needs to 
know: 
• How much do existing security 
problems cost the business? 
• What impact would a catastrophic 
security breach have? 
• What are the most cost-effective 
solutions? 
• What impact will the solutions have on 
the business? 
Financial modelling is a fundamental 
component of all business investment 
cases. IT security investment proposals 
have unique qualities that can pose 
expenditure justification challenges. This 
research is designed to explore various 
financial models and to develop one that IT 
managers can effectively use to support 
their business cases. Determining costs 
incurred as a result of specific attacks 
should seem simple enough to do, but 
typically many intangibles are involved and 
costing analyses can prove somewhat 
challenging. 
The CSI/FBI statistics can provide reliable 
measuring points, but IT managers can use 
alternative methods when developing a 
business case for network security. Single-
loss expectancy (SLE), annualized rate of 
occurrence (ARO), and annual-loss 
expectancy (ALE) can be effectively used 
when attempting to place value on an event 
that did not occur. This paper looks at these 
in detail. 
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3.1. Single-Loss Expectancy; 
The single-loss expectancy (SLE) is the 
cost associated with a single attack on a 
specific asset. SLE is typically determined 
by multiplying an asset's value (for 
example, the value of a server) by its 
exposure factor.  
The formula for calculating SLE is SLE = 
Asset value*Exposure factor 
 
Asset Value 
Asset value can be challenging to estimate. 
In the example of a web server, you must 
determine whether the asset value 
represents the data or simply the media in 
which it resides. 
The asset value could be represented by the 
formula shown as; 
Cost of replacing information + cost of 
replacing software and hardware and 
reconfiguration + lost availability + 
associated costs (loss of data confidentiality 
and integrity) = Total Asset Value 
The asset value cost would vary depending 
on the kind of attack that had occurred. A 
DoS attack, as an example, would typically 
not involve hardware replacement, whereas 
an outright theft of a server would include 
many possible variables, such as costs 
associated with loss of confidentiality and 
integrity. 
 
Exposure Factor 
An exposure factor illustrates an asset's 
vulnerability to a given threat. It measures 
the magnitude of a threat's impact on a 
particular asset and determines a 
percentage of the asset that would be lost 
should a particular type of threat occur.  
An IT manager can attempt to estimate the 
total costs surrounding a single attack, or 
can instead choose to pull information from 
an array of different sources. The CSI/FBI 
information has been discussed, but other 
governmental and institutional agencies 
gather information as well, including the 
UK Department of Trade and Industry 
(DTI) Information Security Breaches 
Survey 2004, published by Pricewaterhouse 
Coopers (PWC) and the DTI. 
Depending on system resources and time 
availability, using third-party data can 
ensure greater credibility and speedier 
compilation when developing a business 
case.  
 
3.2. Annualized Rate of Occurrence: 
 
The annualized rate of occurrence (ARO) is 
the probability, or rate, that an attack might 
happen over a one-year period. Statistics 
can be excellent tools, provided that 
sources are reliable. The CSI/FBI 
determined, as an example, that 36% of its 
respondents had been victims of system 
penetration attacks in 2003. 
Note that at times, statistics from different 
sources can appear to be conflicting. In 
organizational environments that are 
focused on prevention, it is prudent to be 
on the side of caution while continuing to 
study the trending. 
Also it should be Noted that, exposure 
factor is often represented as a decimal 
value, whereas ARO is usually represented 
as a percentage. 
 
3.3. Annual-Loss Expectancy: 
 
With SLE estimates and ARO statistics 
completed, the annual-loss expectancy 
(ALE) can be calculated. The formula used 
is shown below. The ALE can be used in a 
capital-budgeting process whenever an 
organization is considering an equipment 
investment proposal. Relevant attack costs 
can be determined in-house, or 
organizations can comfortably use external 
information culled from a wide cross 
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section of industry and government on the 
North American and European continents. 
The formula for ALE is; 
single loss expectancy (SLE) * annualized 
rate of occurrence (ARO) = ALE  
 
4. Budgeting for Security 
Equipment: 
 
The next step in the business case is to 
develop a cost model for the equipment that 
is designed to protect an organization from 
attack. 
This area explores the cost of equipment, as 
follows: 
• Total cost of ownership 
• Present value 
 
4.1. Total Cost of Ownership: 
 
The total cost of ownership (TCO) includes 
all associated equipment costs, whether 
recurring or nonrecurring, including all 
aspects of hardware, installation, 
maintenance, and upgrades. 
If other costs are pertinent to an 
organization, such as ongoing training, as 
an example, they should be included in the 
final model. Depending on the organization 
and the level of analysis expected from 
those who prepare the metrics, additional 
TCO variables could include the cost of 
floor space, insurance, utilities, and so on. 
Because many factors can affect overall 
calculations, including, but not limited to, 
amortization period or whether the 
equipment is being rented or leased, you 
are encouraged to gather as much data as 
possible before compiling this portion of 
the model. 
 
The total cost of ownership can be 
calculated as; 
 
TCO = P+N+(Y*R) 
Where: 
 
P=procurement cost 
N=Non-Recurring costs 
R=Recurring costs 
Y=useful life of the equation in years 
 
4.2. Analyzing Returns on Security 
Capital Investments: 
 
When compiling data for an IT security 
investment proposal, it can be challenging 
to deliver one of the most basic capital-
budgeting requirements: quantifying 
returns of events not happening, while 
using objective figures to support the 
business case. Fortunately, information 
collected in the annual CSI/FBI survey can 
serve as independent, impartial, and 
reliable data that can effectively illustrate 
potential costs and associated 
vulnerabilities inherent in under-security. 
Choosing an acceptable and representative 
evaluation tool is the next challenge the IT 
executive faces, and this section aids in the 
search of an appropriate analysis tool by 
exploring the merits of the following 
topics: 
• Net present value 
• Internal rate of return 
• Return on investment 
• Payback period 
• The bottom line 
It is important to note that while other 
models can be used, such as economic 
value-added and option models, the 
discussion in this paper is best served by 
focusing the analysis on the four methods 
covered in this section. 
 
4.3. Net Present Value:  
 
Net present value (NPV) provides a dollar 
value for a future return brought back to 
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present time. It is calculated by adding the 
present value of benefits, for every year 
over a specified time period, and then 
subtracting the initial recurring and 
nonrecurring costs of the investment. A 
positive NPV represents a profit, while a 
negative NPV signifies a loss. 
4.4. Internal Rate of Return: 
Internal rate of return (IRR) can be viewed 
as a sort of go/no-go decision level for an 
investment proposal. IRR is often used to 
analyze investments that span over many 
years. IRR is similar to NPV in that IRR 
equals the discount rate by which the net 
benefits must be discounted, over the time 
period, until the point that they equal the 
initial costs.  
 
4.5. Return on Investment: 
 
Return on investment (ROI) is a reliable 
tool that is widely used to compare the 
attractiveness of various business 
investments. ROI equals the present value 
of the net benefits over the useful life of the 
proposed equipment, divided by the TCO 
of the equipment. It is usually expressed as 
a percentage over a specific amount of 
time; three years is a common time span for 
IT equipment. The ROI formula is; 
 
ROI =  PV Savings – PV TCO 
               PV TCO 
 
4.6. Payback and the Bottom Line: 
While payback is simple to calculate, its 
drawback is that it does not sufficiently 
illustrate the magnitude of the savings, nor 
does it highlight any benefits the 
investment could provide after the break-
even point.IT security is a relatively young 
industry. Most established industries have a 
wealth of act upon data that has been 
collective over decades. The security field 
relies on recent data, culled from concerned 
IT and business professionals who cut a 
wide swath across industry and government 
and whose common goal is to create a 
forum for sharing this pertinent data. 
IRR and NPV bring unequalled value to 
financial modelling, but given the specific 
nature of IT security investing, it is the 
view of the authors that ROI, or return on 
security investment (ROSI), is the most 
appropriate vehicle to ensure the effective 
development of an informed and 
substantive business case for network 
security. But no single method is perfect 
for assessing security capital budgeting. 
What cannot be disputed, whether the 
source is CSI/FBI, PWC-UK, or any other 
well-regarded resource, is that cyber-crime 
is on the rise, and the risk to industry, both 
in dollars and reputation, must be measured 
by every organization before any long-term 
plan can be put in place. 
 
5. Acknowledging Nonmathematical 
Security Fundamentals: 
 
Much of the discussion in here has centred 
on why, how, where, and what to secure. 
But the question of when to secure is 
somewhat more elusive. Financial 
modelling can dictate that the time for 
security is when it is financially feasible. 
Managers might say that the time for 
greater security is when something is 
relevant to secure. But much of what is 
protected in IT security is not always 
tangible, for example, customer 
relationships, trust, goodwill, and the 
sanctity of data that supports each entry on 
a financial statement. 
Organizations are highly exposed to the 
vulnerabilities inherent in Internet 
connectivity, and the exposure increases 
every day as viruses become more virulent 
and users neglect to exercise ever-greater 
caution. Moving away from the Internet is 
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not an option for most organizations. 
Competitiveness demands an ever-
increasing presence, and therefore reliance, 
on all things electronic. But many 
organizations have grown much larger by 
using their reliance on the Internet, as the 
face of business transactions has changed 
dramatically over the last generation. 
In her article in iQ magazine, Kathy Harris 
identifies ten categories of potential value 
that businesses can realize by virtue of 
being connected to the Internet: from quick 
time to market, new revenue streams, 
improved customer service, and greater 
process effectiveness to the creation of 
intellectual capital, greater asset utilization, 
and better connectivity with partners and 
vendors. The argument is made that softer 
benefits resulting from the newfound 
reliance on the Internet are difficult to 
quantify, yet going backward cannot be an 
option. She goes on to state that, ". . . 
creating value propositions always requires 
a certain amount of qualitative judgment. 
The financial modelling in this paper 
should be fully used and effectively 
presented. But in the end, IT security is far 
greater than the mere sum of its parts.  
In order to answer these questions, 
measurement tools that show how security 
problems and expenditures impact the 
bottom line are needed. The Holy Grail of 
security, from business point of view, is to 
be able to calculate a return on investment 
(ROI) for any security expenditure. The 
search of an effective way to measure ROI 
for security has lead to a number of 
interesting models, none of which have yet 
been accepted as the standard 
methodology. 
 
ROI and ROSI defined 
ROI is a simple yet powerful concept. 
‘Which of these options gives me the most 
value for my money?’-that’s the 
fundamental question that ROI is designed 
to answer. ROI is frequently used to 
compare alternative investment strategies. 
To calculate ROI the cost of a purchase is 
weighted against the expected returns over 
the life of the item. A blended attack hit. 
Managers responsible for computer 
security are increasingly required to justify 
their budget requests in purely economic 
terms. There has been considerable 
discussion of economic metrics used to 
justify and evaluate investments in 
computer security at trade and academic 
meetings, as well as in computer security 
journals.  
In the case of security the expected return 
is often interpreted as the amount of money 
that company will save from not having 
security problems as a result of the 
investment. This is because security 
investments usually don’t create value-they 
simply prevent bad things from happening. 
The cost of a bad thing happening is called 
risk exposure. A security solution mitigates 
that risk by some percentage. Multiplying 
the exposure by the percentage mitigated 
gives the expected return.  
The trick with return on security 
investment (ROSI) is in figuring out the 
expected returns and the true cost of the 
investment. Determining expected returns 
for security investment involves estimating 
the risk exposure and the amount a solution 
will mitigate the risk, neither of which is 
easy.  
The inability to predict the total cost 
associated with security incidents can be 
sidestepped if we can find a single cost 
component that; can be consistently 
measured, strongly correlates to the overall 
cost or is significant in its own right. 
Make such a health check broad in order to 
capture risks associated with every stage of 
a programme. Areas for consideration 
should include, but not limited to: 
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• Commercial arrangement with 
suppliers 
• Organizational issues (roles, 
responsibilities, skills, resources); 
• Project planning 
• Change management 
• Requirements definition 
• Design 
• Build 
• Configuration management 
• Test and acceptance 
• Quality strategy 
• Risk management strategy 
• Go live and cutover plans 
• Licence agreements 
• Support contracts 
• Technical evvironments 
• Physical and electronic security 
• Business processes and continuity 
• User tranning  
• Failover and redundancy 
Key questions in each of these areas 
produce an immediate and accurate picture 
of a programme’s health. Once this health 
status has been determined the correct 
course of treatment can then be prescribed. 
Output from a health check activity should 
be a comprehensive risk register, with risks 
classified in terms of both the likelihood 
and impact of occurrence. The register can 
then be used to focus finite programme 
resources on those risks that fall outside an 
organization’s level of tolerability. 
It is our opinion that a security incident’s 
impact on productivity makes for an ideal 
cost component that suits all three 
conditions. Most important by using 
productivity as the exposure component of 
ROSI, security projects that improve 
business efficiency are prompted and those 
projects justified solely by fear of the 
unknown are eliminated. A meaningful 
ROSI can be calculated by focusing on the 
impact security has on productivity. 
 
6. The relationship between 
productivity and security: 
 
The productivity lost due to security 
incident can have a serious impact on the 
bottom line. For many organizations the 
cost of lost productivity associated with a 
security incident is far greater than the cost 
of data recovery or system repair. 
Productivity is not only a factor in risk 
exposure-it’s a factor in the cost of a 
solution as well. Because security almost 
always comes at the cost of convenience, 
most security solutions end up creating 
hurdles that employees need to jump in 
order to do their jobs. Depending on the 
size and frequency of these hurdles, the lost 
productivity cost can seriously add up. The 
situation doesn’t have to be grim it is 
possible for security solutions to increase 
productivity, (Udo, 2001). This happens 
when side-effects of a solution eliminate 
other significant problems that were 
hampering productivity. For example 
implanting a firewall might require network 
restructuring. The new structure might 
solve serious bandwidth problems that were 
previously creating extensive downtime. 
With good planning most security solutions 
can be implanted in a way that results in an 
overall enhancement of productivity. The 
cost of a solution must include the impact 
of the solution on productivity, since this 
number is often large enough to make or 
break the viability of a given solution. 
 
Conclusions: 
 
Effective IT budgeting must relate the 
available funds to the expected returns and 
should take into account not only the 
investment and resource requirements of all 
IT initiatives on a project by project basis 
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but also the capacity of the organization to 
undertake the work.  
Thus the research will provide a solution 
which offers a customizable, guided 
process for constructing a performance-
based budget, which can be as simple or as 
sophisticated as required to fit the needs of 
the organization. The required budget can 
then be built on a project and asset basis, 
and funds can then be built on a project and 
asset basis, and funds can then be allocated 
from different departments or other funding 
sources. 
Organizations are highly exposed to the 
vulnerabilities inherent in Internet 
connectivity, and the exposure increases 
every day as viruses become more virulent 
and users neglect to exercise ever-greater 
caution. Moving away from the Internet is 
not an option for most organizations. 
Competitiveness demands an ever-
increasing presence, and therefore reliance, 
on all things electronic. But many 
organizations have grown much larger by 
using their reliance on the Internet, as the 
face of business transactions has changed 
dramatically over the last generation.  
The Holy Grail of security, from business 
point of view, is to be able to calculate a 
return on investment (ROI) for any security 
expenditure. The search of an effective way 
to measure ROI for security has lead to a 
number of interesting models, none of 
which have yet been accepted as the 
standard methodology. 
The research is the real world 
implementation of the concepts put forth in 
this discussion. Its goal is to provide a 
trustworthy standard for security 
benchmarking, one that produces 
consistently repeatable results which are 
strongly correlated to financial 
performance. The unique approach taken 
by this document is its focus on 
productivity. Risk exposure is measured as 
the productivity loss due to existing 
security issues. Solutions are to minimize 
this loss and therefore provide instantly 
reliable returns, as opposed to returns that 
only happen if the security solution 
prevents a major disaster. 
The assumption is that serious disasters are 
rare and hard to quantify but everyday 
incidents create a significant amount of 
aggregate loss. Solving these problems 
provides real returns and improves security 
at the same time, which has the side-effect 
of preventing some of those major 
disasters. 
Not only is productivity a major factor in 
calculating risk exposure, it’s also a 
significant factor in the cost of a solution. 
Security solutions can have a positive, 
negative or neutral influence on 
organizational productivity. This influence 
can be significant and must be factored into 
the cost of the solution. The paper can 
estimate the impact a given solution will 
have on overall productivity. This impact is 
factored in when prioritizing underlying 
problems and their respective solutions. 
The analysis indicates the top problems 
prioritized by their impact on risk exposure 
and lost productivity. Likewise the 
solutions presented are selected based on 
their predicted ability to mitigate risk and 
minimise lost productivity. The result is the 
only automated, repeatable and consistent 
ROSI benchmarking system available to 
date. By far after implementing the project 
the organization can have the following 
benefits: 
• Increase online sales 
• Enhance customer satisfaction 
• Improve ROI 
• Protect reputation 
• Maximise your reach 
• Ensure availability 
• Maximise customer retention 
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